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I. Introduction
When President Teddy Roosevelt summarized his brand of foreign
policy with the phrase "speak softly and carry a big stick,"' the "big
stick" he referred to was likely to be a gunboat or battleship. For U.S.
policymakers in more recent times, however, it has been economic sanc-
tions. Reluctance to use military force, combined with the development
of a global economic system, have made economic sanctions a preferred
policy tool of the United States in the conduct of its foreign relations. 2
Although the concept of economic sanctions conjures up the narrow im-
age of punitive measures taken against another state, this Comment will
give the term a broader meaning, encompassing a broad spectrum of
state action that employs non-military means to pursue foreign policy
objectives. Recent examples of economic sanctions thus defined have
ranged from imposing embargoes on hostile states3 to bartering for the
release of American hostages.4 This policy tool has become even more
t J.D. candidates, Yale Law School. The authors would like to thank Professor W.
Michael Reisman of Yale Law School for his criticism of earlier drafts of this Comment. Any
errors or omissions are, of course, solely ours.
1. Speech by Theodore Roosevelt, Minnesota State Fair (Sept. 2, 1901), quoted in J. BART-
LETr, BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 847 (14th ed. 1968).
2. See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLICY (1985) (listing examples of recent U.S. sanctions against South Africa,
Nicaragua, and Libya).
In analyzing economic sanctions, we are also concerned with the wide variety of related
foreign affairs actions that have economic consequences. See, e.g., infra text accompanying
notes 109-118 (discussing claims settlements).
3. See, e.g., Documents Showing the Evolution of Sanctions Against Libya, 25 I.L.M. 173
(1986).
4. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979), reprinted it 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1982) (blocking removal and transfer of Iranian government property); Exec. Order
No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982) (banning imports
from Iran); Exec. Order Nos. 12,277-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,913-31 (1981), reprinted in 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1982) (implementing the Declarations of the Government of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria (Algiers Accords), Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 224
(1984)).
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critical in today's global economy in which it is increasingly difficult to
consider any major event in any country in isolation. Greater interde-
pendence has forced the United States to pursue a more active foreign
policy. Since it is impossible for the United States to resort to military
force at every foreign policy juncture, economic sanctions have become a
critically important means by which the United States can influence
world developments.
Unfortunately, economic sanctions undertaken under the banner of
foreign policy often have serious domestic repercussions. For example,
when the President announces a grain embargo against the Soviet Union,
he injures American wheat farmers. When he signs an executive claims
settlement, he surrenders legitimate claims that American citizens may
have against a foreign state.
The increased use of economic sanctions and the resultant increase in
injury to U.S. domestic interests have coincided with two phenomena.
First, the federal courts have shown a greater willingness to entertain
lawsuits that implicate foreign affairs.5 Second, there has been increased
enthusiasm on the part of private litigants for using courts to challenge
foreign policies with which they disagree.6 When planning economic
sanctions, policymakers in the Executive Branch must therefore be pre-
pared for constitutional challenges to be brought and heard.
This Comment argues that the use of sanctions must always be as-
sessed in the context not only of the sanctions' objectives but also of their
likely costs. After examining the case law and the policy arguments that
surround the President's exercise of the foreign affairs power we assert
that the Just Compensation Clause7 should be applied by the federal
courts to force the Executive to compensate persons within the United
States who suffer losses because of economic sanctions, and propose a
framework for court decision in this field. By outlining the types of sanc-
tions for which compensation should be provided, this prescriptive analy-
5. See infra text accompanying notes 48-60 (discussing the political question doctrine).
6. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (challenge to U.S. abrogation of
Mutual Defense Treaty with Republic of China); Pietsch v. United States, 788 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.)
(challenge to U.S. policy in Nicaragua), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 101 (1986); Americans United
For Separation of Church and State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1986) (challenge to U.S.
decision to send an Ambassador to the Vatican), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 314 (1986); Crockett
v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (suit by 29 members of Congress
challenging U.S. presence in, and military assistance to, El Salvador), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1251 (1984); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975) (challenge to U.S. military and
economic assistance to Israel), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
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sis also serves as a guide for sanctions-planners seeking to obtain policy
results at the lowest possible cost.
II. The Constitutional Framework of Economic Sanctions
The President's constitutional and statutory authority includes the
power to impose virtually any type of economic sanction.8 Thus, any
challenge to an economic sanctions program on the grounds that the
President is acting beyond his authority will fail. To succeed against eco-
nomic sanctions in federal court, a litigant must rely on the Bill of
Rights, demonstrating that some aspect of the program violates a right
guaranteed by the Constitution. The following analysis considers how
constitutional protections operate in the context of foreign affairs and
concludes that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
uniquely suited to the resolution of claims arising out of the imposition of
economic sanctions.
A. Presidential Authority
The Constitution does not explicitly grant the President the power to
impose economic sanctions. The President must infer such authority
from his unenumerated foreign affairs power9 and from his authority as
Commander-in-Chief. 10 Even though the text of the Constitution argua-
bly lodges the power to impose economic sanctions with Congress,II the
Supreme Court has recently established that the President's imposition of
economic sanctions, if accompanied by congressional acquiescence, is
virtually immune from attack on separation of powers grounds. In
Dames & Moore v. Regan,1 2 private litigants challenged President Rea-
gan's authority to enforce President Carter's economic sanctions pro-
gram against Iran. They argued that Treasury Secretary Donald Regan
could not constitutionally nullify federal court attachments against Ira-
nian assets, transfer such assets out of the country, or suspend ongoing
federal litigation against Iranian entities. 13 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, rejected these arguments.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist analyzed the plaintiffs'
claims by invoking the three categories of presidential action first devel-
8. See infra text accompanying notes 21-26.
9. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-21 (1936)
(arguing that the President possesses unenumerated powers in foreign affairs).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 21-26.
12. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
13. Id. at 667.
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oped by Justice Jackson in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer.14 In the first category, the President "acts pursuant to an
express or implied authorization from Congress." 15 Under these circum-
stances, the executive action "'would be supported by the strongest of
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack
it.' "16 In the second category, which Justice Jackson termed a" 'zone of
twilight,'" "the President acts in the absence of Congressional authoriza-
tion." 17 The third category, entitled to the least judicial deference, in-
volves presidential action that is "in contravention of the will of
Congress."' 18 The Dames & Moore Court held that the nullification of
attachments was clearly within Jackson's first category, 19 and that "Con-
gress has implicitly approved" of the transfer of assets.20
Economic sanctions, as Dames & Moore makes plain, also fall into
Jackson's first category. Congress has explicitly authorized the President
to engage in a broad variety of economic sanctions. The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA),21 for example, which grants
power to the President to impose economic sanctions during peacetime,
authorizes the President to "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nul-
lify, void, prevent or prohibit . . . any right, power, or privilege with
respect to . . .any property in which any foreign country or national
thereof has an interest."'22 In order to wield this wide-ranging authority
the President need only "declare a national emergency with respect to"
any "extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial
part outside the United States,"'23  and "in every possible in-
stance.., consult with the Congress."'2 4 IEEPA's predecessor, the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act (TWEA), whose application has been limited to
14. Id. at 668 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 669.
19. Id. at 674.
20. Id. at 680 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, as amended, 22
U.S.C. §§ 1621-45 (1982 & Supp. 1987)); id. at 681 (citing the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (1982)). The President relied upon this
authorization when he acted. See, e.g., Exec. Order. No. 12,170, supra note 4 (blocking Ira-
nian government property and citing IEEPA and the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (1982), as authority for that action).
21. IEEPA, supra note 20.
22. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
23. Id. § 1701(a).
24. Id. § 1703.
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wartime, granted the President even more expansive powers. 25 This
broad grant of explicit authority26 leads to the conclusion that when the
President imposes economic sanctions, his authority is at its height. The
issue is, therefore, not whether the President has the power to impose
economic sanctions, but whether and to what degree the Constitution
imposes accountability upon the President when he exercises such power.
B. Due Process Constraints
Property rights in the United States are usually protected against fed-
eral government interference through the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 27 Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly,28 the federal courts have extended due process protec-
tion to a wide variety of government-created entitlements in the domestic
context.29 As the right-privilege distinction has fallen into disfavor,30 the
courts have become more active in protecting private parties who rely on
various forms of property and expect that property to be safe from arbi-
trary governmental action. Specifically, the courts have read strict pro-
cedural requirements into the Fourteenth Amendment when the
government seeks to deny or revoke a legal interest that it has created.31
In theory, when the President imposes economic sanctions, he remains
bound by the Bill of Rights.32 Consequently, the standard due process
25. See Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982)
(allowing President to vest property in which a foreign country or its national has an interest);
id. § 10(c) (allowing President to issue licenses to U.S. persons to infringe on foreign-owned
patents). Cf H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7 (1977) (TWEA had "become
essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to exercise, at his discretion, broad
powers in both the domestic and international arena without congressional review.").
26. The President's power to impose economic sanctions during peacetime is somewhat
less broad than his authority to do so during wartime. When Congress enacted IEEPA in
1977, it simultaneously amended TWEA to apply only to time of war. IEEPA, Pub. L. No.
95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977). Thus, during peacetime, the President must rely on
IEEPA rather than on TWEA for his statutory authority to wage economic warfare. IEEPA
grants narrower authority than does TWEA. For example, under IEEPA, the President can
only freeze assets and cannot vest them as he could under TWEA. Compare IEEPA, supra
note 20, § 1702 (a)(1)(B) ("President may... investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit") with TWEA, supra note 25, § 5(b) ("any property or interest of any
foreign country or national thereof shall vest" in an agency designated by the President).
27. The guarantees of the Fifth Amendment have been incorporated, through the Four-
teenth Amendment, to protect against state government interference as well. Chicago, B. & Q,
R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
28. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
29. See cases cited infra note 33.
30. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
31. See cases cited infra note 33.
32. The President remains bound by the U.S. Constitution when he acts against U.S. citi-
zens, even if his actions take place in the realm of foreign affairs:
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guarantees should extend to all property affected by executive action. In
practice, however, the "due process" revolution has failed to affect the
foreign affairs power, in spite of its broadened applications to a variety of
"liberty and property" interests.33 Perhaps recognizing the need for
swift and decisive presidential action in emergencies, courts have not
burdened the Executive with even the fundamental "notice and hearing"
requirements, even when its actions in conducting foreign policy affect an
individual's property interest.34 Even the Administrative Procedure Act,
which governs the actions of the entire administrative bureaucracy of the
United States, explicitly exempts "foreign affairs functions" from its no-
tice and hearing requirements. 35
When the President acts under delegated authority at the height of his
foreign affairs powers, he is given broad freedom from due process con-
straints otherwise unthinkable in a domestic context. 36 Whether this
abandonment of due process in foreign affairs is equitable is a matter for
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have
no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the
shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his
life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to live in another
land.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1956) (footnote omitted); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952) (commander-in-chief power does not authorize
President to seize steel mills during wartime labor dispute because such seizure is a usurpation
of the Constitution's grant of law-making to Congress); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (President's foreign affairs power, "like every other gov-
ernmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the
Constitution."); Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaidsell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties); United
States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88 (1921) ("the mere existence of a state of war
could not suspend or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaranties and
limitations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments .... ."); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) ("The war power of the United States, like its other
powers and like the police power of the States, is subject to applicable constitutional limita-
tions .... ").
33. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495-96 (1980) (government must provide hear-
ing before involuntarily transferring convict to mental hospital); Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division v. Kraft, 436 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (receipt of services from public utility not terminable
"'except for good and sufficient cause .. '" (quoting Farmer v. Nashville, 156 S.W. 189,
190 (1913))); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (right of public education may not be
withdrawn because of misconduct "absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine
whether the misconduct has occurred."); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 (1970) (gov-
ernment must provide a hearing before terminating welfare benefits).
34. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 255-56 (1972) (hearing
requirements).
35. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (1982) (military and for-
eign affairs exception to notice requirements in agency rule-making); id. § 554(a)(4) (military
and foreign affairs exception to hearing requirements in agency rule-making).
36. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).
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debate in another place. 37 It is, however, clearly lawful. The foreign af-
fairs power provides special dispensation for the President to "take" any-
thing he deems a particular situation may require. However, while it
may not be desirable, or even feasible, for the constitutional process to
provide prior restraints on such power, this does not preclude ex post
constraints on executive action.
C. Just Compensation Constraints
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the consti-
tutional provision under which relief should be sought in response to
deprivations caused by economic sanctions. Courts should be particu-
larly solicitous of these claims for three reasons. First, the Just Compen-
sation Clause is particularly applicable to the economic powers of the
President since the exercise of these powers usually results in the sacrifice
of individual property interests for some greater national policy objective.
The very purpose of the Just Compensation Clause is to "bar Govern-
ment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 38 Justice
Powell noted in his concurrence in Dames & Moore that "the govern-
ment must pay just compensation when it furthers the Nation's foreign
policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims lawfully held by a rela-
tively few persons."' 39 The Just Compensation Clause thus lays the con-
stitutional basis for the "spreading" of the costs of public policy among
its beneficiaries.
37. Academic commentators have attacked this lack of due process. See Leigh & Atkeson,
Due Process in the Emerging Foreign Relations Law of the United States (pts. 1 & 2), 21 Bus.
LAW. 853 (1966), 22 Bus. LAW. 3 (1966) (arguing that individuals should have the right to a
hearing in the foreign affairs 'context); Timberg, Wanted: Administrative Safeguards for the
Protection of the Individual in International Economic Regulation, 17 ADMIN. L. REV. 159,
167 (1965) ("A general re-examination of State Department and cognate Executive Branch
procedures in order to provide notice, hearing and the other attributes of administrative due
process, wherever necessary and feasible, would do more than rehabilitate the law. It would
allay the mistrust of many persons who have sought to put legislative and constitutional re-
straints on the power of the President and the State Department to carry on the foreign rela-
tions of the United States.").
38. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also United States v. Caltex
(Phillipines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It seems to me that the
guiding principle should be this: Whenever the government determines that one person's
property-whatever it may be-is essential to the war effort and appropriates it for the com-
mon good, the public purse, rather than the individual, should bear the loss."); Gray v. United
States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340, 393 (1886) ("It seems to us that this 'bargain'.. . by which the present
peace and quiet of the United States, as well as their future prosperity and greatness were
largely secured, and which was brought about by the sacrifice of the interests of individual
citizens falls within the intent and meaning of the Constitution, which prohibits the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation.").
39. 453 U.S. at 690, 691 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Second, enforcement of the Just Compensation Clause would simply
require the President to pay for property taken by an economic sanctions
program and would not involve activist judicial management of foreign
policy, a role the courts have properly avoided. The imposition of a com-
pensation requirement on the Executive would not prevent the President
from taking necessary action when the situation demanded it, for just
compensation claims would be administered expost. Also, the possibility
of economic harm to private citizens as a result of sanctions would not
bar their timely implementation, since the Executive could be confident
that no court would enjoin its actions.
Third, as a matter of policy, enforcing the Just Compensation Clause
against the Executive might well lead to a more effective use of economic
sanctions. The Just Compensation Clause, by imposing expost accounta-
bility, would force the President to take all the costs of an economic
sanctions program into account before acting. The inability of sanctions
planners to assess the true costs of sanctions programs has resulted in the
indiscriminate, and often ineffective, use of many economic sanctions.4°
Sanctions, and the harm they cause, should .not be seen as ends in them-
selves. Rather, sanctions are the means by which the Executive achieves
certain analytically independent goals, such as change in the behavior of
a target state. As such, both the costs and the benefits of the contem-
plated action should be assessed before implementation.
Failure to understand the distinction between the after-the-fact nature
of just compensation and the prior restraints required by due process has
confused the few courts that have considered claims for just compensa-
tion arising out of foreign affairs. United States v. Caltex (Phillipines),
Inc. 41 provides an example of a court's mistaken concern about inhibiting
the decision-making process and its consequent reluctance to order com-
pensation. In Caltex, the plaintiff sought just compensation for the U.S.
Army's destruction of its oil refinery in the Phillipines in 1941. Revers-
ing the Court of Appeal's decision, the Supreme Court held that the de-
struction of the plaintiff's refinery to prevent its capture by enemy troops
was not compensable. The majority opinion referred to an incident
where the mayor of London refused to order the destruction of several
houses as a firebreak for fear of incurring liability for trespass. 42 As a
result of the mayor's inaction, the fire spread destruction to the rest of
the city. The Caltex Court, however, could just as easily have cited to
40. See generally G. HUFBAUER & I. SCHOTr, supra note 2.
41. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
42. Id. at 155 n.7 (citing Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 363 (1788)).
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Mayor of New York v. Lord.43 In that case, the mayor of New York, who
created a firebreak and saved his city in an identical situation, was never-
theless held liable for "taking" the property of the house owners. The ex
post judgment against New York did not inhibit the mayor's response to
the emergency, and it successfully allowed the cost of the mayor's action
to be spread among those it benefitted. If courts adopt the essential argu-
ment of this Comment-that ex post monetary compensation does not
inhibit rapid decision-making in foreign affairs-then there should be no
bar to the constitutional mandate ,that takings for a public purpose be
compensated.
We argue that protection of the individual's interests in the foreign
affairs context should lie in the Just Compensation Clause, not in the
Due Process Clause. Requirements like "notice and hearing" throttle
the government's ability to act speedily and decisively during an interna-
tional crisis. Yet, courts should not hesitate-as the Caltex court did-
to order compensation out of concern for inhibiting the President's
power to act. While it is true that compensation forces the Executive to
consider the costs to the Treasury of the action it is contemplating, mon-
etary considerations will not prevent quick action in truly critical
situations.
III. Prudential Barriers in the U.S. Federal Courts
Courts cannot entertain just compensation claims arising out of eco-
nomic sanctions programs unless they first determine such claims to be
justiciable. Assuming that litigants possess standing, the most important
bar to adjudication is prudential abstention. In the past, several absten-
tion doctrines have blocked just compensation claims. They include the
political question doctrine and the act of state doctrine. A careful read-
ing of the case law, coupled with our analysis of the Just Compensation
Clause, suggests that courts should not abstain from adjudicating just
compensation claims in foreign affairs.
A. Political Question Doctrine
In an earlier era, the Supreme Court cases occasionally stated that law-
suits involving foreign affairs issues were nonjusticiable. 44 Recently,
43. 18 Wend. 126 (Ct. Corr. Err. N.Y. 1837).
44. See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948):
[Tihe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.
Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments
of the government, Executive and Legislative .... They are decisions of a kind for




however, the Supreme Court appears to have grown reluctant to apply
the political question doctrine in the foreign affairs context. 45 Indeed,
Baker v. Carr, the modem restatement of the political question doc-
trine, 46 declared that "it is error to suppose that every case or contro-
versy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 47
Lower federal courts have avoided this "error," at least in some cases, by
deciding suits that implicate foreign affairs on their merits. 48 For exam-
ple, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, recently rejected political question
challenges and granted an injunction to prevent American soldiers from
seizing a ranch in Honduras which belonged to an American citizen.49
While the injunction was a clear aberration which was quickly vacated
by the Supreme Court,50 even the dissent in the Circuit Court agreed that
the plaintiff could seek compensation in Claims Court.5 1
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent analysis in Japanese Whal-
ing Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y 52 suggests that the political ques-
[sic] long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial
intrusion or inquiry.
Id. at 111; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("Certainly it is not the
function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation-even by a citizen-which challenges
the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed
forces abroad or to any particular region."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the nation.").
45. See Japanese Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2866 (1986)
(no political question bar to adjudication of validity of Executive actions under a statute imple-
menting an international agreement). But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart and Stevens, JJ.) (challenge to the
President's ability to terminate a treaty without the advice or consent of the Senate or the
House of Representatives presents a political question "because it involves the authority of the
President in the conduct of our ... foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or
Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President.").
46. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (six-factor test for determining if a case presents a political
question).
47. Id. at 211; see also Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597, 604 (1976) ("The Supreme Court has not recently held any issue to be textually commit-
ted by the Constitution to the other branches and therefore not justiciable-a 'political ques-
tion.' "); Tigar, Judicial Power, the "Political Question Doctrine," and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. Rnv. 1135, 1135 (1970) ("The words 'political question doctrine' are set off by
inverted commas to denote my view that there is, properly speaking, no such thing.").
48. See, e.g., Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (no polit-
ical question bar to adjudication of claim that action of U.S. government in helping to plan,
implement, and finance program of land reform in El Salvador resulted in the taking of prop-
erty for which just compensation was due), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985).
49. Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (no political question bar to
adjudication of claim that U.S. marines in Honduras may not run military exercises on plain-
tiff's private pastures when the land has not been expropriated), judgment vacated on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
50. Weinberger v. Ramirez, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
51. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986).
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tion doctrine will not bar a suit asking for just compensation for a taking
arising out of an economic sanctions program. The policy behind polit-
ical question abstention, the Whaling Ass'n Court stated, is to "exclude
from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy
choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolu-
tion to the halls of Congress or the confines of the executive branch. ' 53
In such circumstances, "the judiciary is particularly ill-suited to make
such decisions."' 54 Where, however, the litigation involved only inter-
preting legislation, "a recurring and accepted task [of] the federal
courts," the Court found no political question bar. 5
A claim for compensation under the Fifth Amendment has been called
"a paradigmatic issue for resolution by the judiciary, ' 56 and hearing such
claims is certainly a "recurring and accepted task" of the courts.57
Moreover, the judiciary regularly considers issues that affect foreign na-
tions, such as foreign sovereign immunity in suits against foreign states58
and the extraterritorial reach of American jurisdiction.5 9 A suit for just
compensation has an attenuated effect on foreign nations and is largely a
53. Id. at 2866.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1512.
57. "[Fjederal courts historically have resolved disputes over land." Id. (citing Meigs v.
McClung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1915)); see also Almota Farmers Elevator & Ware-
house v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973) (deciding whether property was taken when con-
demnation of property did not compensate for the expectation that lease would be renewed);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (property was not taken
when grant of landmark status prevented owners from erecting an office building over Grand
Central Terminal).
58. As the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1982), states:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of foreign
states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants .... Claims of foreign
states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the
States in conformity with the principles set forth in this chapter.
See also Victory Transp. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964) (Spanish General Consul, by agreeing to arbitrate in New York, deemed to
have consented to jurisdiction of court in action to compel arbitration), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
934 (1965); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) (merchant vessel owned but
not possessed by friendly foreign government not immune from suit in rem in admiralty). But
see Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (admiralty jurisdiction of Dis-
trict Courts does not extend to a libel in rem against a ship owned by the Italian government).
59. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 923-24 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (con-
cluding that the United States has prescriptive jurisdiction over alleged anticompetitive acts of
foreign airlines directed against another foreign airline, even though "most of the conspirato-
rial acts took place in other countries," because "the economic consequences of the alleged
actions gravely impair significant American interests."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (U.S. antitrust law extends to agreements to restrain
trade entered into abroad, if these agreements would have been illegal if made in the United
States, and if the agreements were intended to affect imports into the United States).
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domestic matter between an American citizen and his government.
Although such a "controversy may, in a sense, be termed 'political,' "60
there should be no compelling reason for a federal court to abstain.
B. Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine, arising out of principles of comity, has also
been raised as a prudential barrier.61 In Ramirez v. Weinberger,62 the
dissent argued that the subsequent recognition of the ranch seizure by
the Honduran government was an act of state which the U.S. courts were
prevented from questioning. 63 But the act of state doctrine, a creature of
the judiciary, is designed to foster comity with other nations, not to
shield American government actions that exact benefit from the sacrifice
of private American interests. When the United States participates in or
authorizes the seizure of American property in conjunction with a for-
eign state, the doctrine should not be used to avoid holding the Executive
accountable in the courts for its actions. Although the invocation of the
act of state doctrine in a just compensation claim might be legally per-
missible, the compelling reasons that justify the doctrine's existence
would not apply in the context of an American's claim against his or her
government.
In sum, courts invoke abstention doctrines when they believe either
that they are not suited to resolve the merits of a primarily "political"
claim or that adjudication of the claim would interfere with America's
foreign relations. Just compensation claims, on the other hand, are per-
fectly suited to judicial resolution and do not implicate America's rela-
tions with other states. Consequently, this Comment's recommendations
neither conflict with the reasons that courts have given for abstaining nor
seek to change the current rationale behind prudential barriers.
60. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942-44 (1983). Admittedly, individuals who have had
their property harmed by an exercise of the foreign affairs power have traditionally looked to
Congress for relief. But the existence of alternate fora does not suggest that the courts should
automatically dismiss a legitimate constitutional claim from being heard. The six-part test of
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), for example, does not include the existence of alter-
nate fora as a factor counseling abstention.
61. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) ("The act of
state doctrine... expresses the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the
task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this
country's pursuit of goals ....").
62. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 1571-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IV. Modern Interpretation of the Just Compensation Clause
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is deceptively
simple. It guarantees that "private property [shall not] be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation. '" 64 But "the Taking Clause of the
Fifth Amendment has not always been read literally, 65 and the courts
have struggled to give content to the terms "property," "taking," "just
compensation," and "public use."
Because modern Just Compensation Clause analysis has narrowed the
measure of compensation, 66 abandoned the "public use" requirement,67
and generally been willing to accept an expansive definition of "prop-
erty," 68 the central focus of debate has shifted to narrowing the definition
of a "taking." This has proved one of the most difficult tasks of judges
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 123, 142 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
66. This narrowing of compensation has taken place despite the lofty rhetoric of just com-
pensation analysis. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (Just Compensa-
tion Clause was meant to restore the owner of taken property "in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken"; nevertheless, the measure of compensation
is only market value at time of taking, and not necessarily highest value to user). For an
extreme view of this trend, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 182-215 (1985).
67. The "public use" limitation is intended to prevent certain takings of property by limit-
ing the ends for which the government may use its power of condemnation. But in the modern
regulatory state, where government is involved in nearly every facet of society, the public use
limitation has lost almost all of its vigor as it applies to government power. See, e.g., Courtesy
Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402 (1963) (govern-
ment condemnation of land for construction by government agency of office building held
taking for a public purpose), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963). See generally Note, The
Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
For a critique of this trend, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 66, at 161-81. The most spectacular
recent example of the decline of the public use limitation was the Supreme Court's 1984 deci-
sion in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). The Court in that case
permitted the state of Hawaii to enact large-scale land reform by the forced sale of land, at
predetermined prices, to tenants and other landless families. Id. at 245. The "public use" to
be achieved by the Hawaiian land reforms was to cure the perceived ills of oligopolistic land
ownership.
68. As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373, 377-78 (1945),
It is conceivable that the [word property] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense of
the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights recognized by law. On
the other hand, it may have been employed in a more accurate sense to denote the whole
group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to
possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the phrase has been
the latter .... In other words, it deals with what lawyers term the individual's "interest"
in the thing in question. That interest may comprise the group of rights for which the
shorthand term is "a fee simple" or it may be the interest known as an "estate or tenancy
for years". . . . The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the
citizen may possess.
See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108 (airspace over Grand Central Terminal as property).
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and legal theorists, and an accurate test remains elusive.6 9 The Supreme
Court itself has candidly acknowledged its inability "to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the govern-
ment."'70 Instead, the Court has stated that the answer to the question of
"whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the govern-
ment's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends
largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.' "71
Applying the Just Compensation Clause is also difficult because almost
any governmental action that affects private rights "takes" an interest
that might be regarded as property. The modern regulatory state has
permanently altered the antiquated terms by which our society used to
define individual rights against the state and other citizens. From taxes
or the military draft to the most complex regulatory measures, the legal
system infringes upon an individual's right to absolute dominion over her
body or labor. Whether such freedom is a natural right or is granted by
some original social contract, the ongoing operation of government con-
stantly affects and modifies those rights that we might wish to call
"property."
"Takings" analysis is marked by a distinction between physical de-
struction and regulatory destruction. "A 'taking' may more readily be
found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government,"' 72 in other words, whenever the gov-
ernment "'regularly use[s], or permanently occup[ies], space or a thing
which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership.' 73
Physical invasion is a relatively easy concept for courts to understand
and apply. Where there is actual deprivation of physical property, courts
cannot style the intrusion as simply "regulation." There is no reason
why this definition of a taking cannot be applied when foreign affairs are
implicated.
A more problematic case arises, however, when there is no physical
appropriation, yet the property interest has clearly been damaged or de-
69. For scholarly discussion of the takings problem, see generally B. ACKERMAN, PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977) (arguing that a court can judge a taking by
viewing the case from the vantage point of the ordinary observer); R. EPSTEIN, supra note 66
(arguing that the same high standards of protection should be given to private property as to
other constitutional rights); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethi-
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
70. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
71. Id. (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)).
72. Id.
73. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1184.
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stroyed by governmental action. The mere devaluation of property has
been held not to constitute a taking for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment.74 Recognizing that laws and state action may have the incidental
effect of limiting the use or potential value of private property, courts
have held that a regulation does not "take" property unless it "goes too
far."'75 Whether for reasons of equity or efficiency, compensation will be
ordered only if a law's deprivatory effects result in the deliberate and
complete destruction of "distinct investment-backed expectations. '76
The difficulty with judging the legitimacy of expectations is that this
standard is too malleable. Any claim based on an interest or right cre-
ated by law would be vulnerable to the argument that such interest or
right was in fact held subject to whatever conditions the state wished to
impose. For example, if the government were to pass a statute that pro-
claimed all real property in the United States to be held subject to a
revocable license, then any future appropriation of that property would
not be a taking because there could be no reasonable expectation of free-
dom from governmental interference. 77
The availability of alternative protections has been an important ele-
ment in cases considering takings claims. For example, despite dicta to
the contrary,78 it is now clear that the Just Compensation Clause does
not extend to creditors in domestic bankruptcy proceedings.79 Such
creditors are not, however, completely unprotected. Although they may
74. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 ("Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining
other land-use regulations, which, like the New York City law, are reasonably related to the
promotion of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property
value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking.' ").
75. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("The general
rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.").
76. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
77. This argument is often raised in the Fourth Amendment context, where courts try to
assess whether the search in question violated a "reasonable expectation of privacy." However,
if the government were to advertise that all homes were subject to search, no one would be able
to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such difficulties have not prevented the
courts from applying the expectations test. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362
(1967); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) ("The
bankruptcy power, like the other substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth
Amendment.") (footnote omitted). This oft-quoted phrase of Justice Brandeis laid the founda-
tion for the argument that any impairment of creditors' rights in a bankruptcy reorganization
constitutes a "taking" compensable by the Fifth Amendment.
79. For a thorough discussion of the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, see
Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Rela-
tionship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973
(1983). Rogers demonstrates that the various restraints on creditors' rights in a debtor's prop-
erty are not invalidated by the Fifth Amendment, and that "takings" do not occur in bank-
ruptcy even when the law completely wipes out the value of any property interest held by the
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not receive Fifth Amendment compensation for their destroyed expecta-
tions, all bankruptcy proceedings are carefully monitored through a
number of unique procedural due process safeguards.80 Thus, the lack of
just compensation in the bankruptcy context is balanced by significant
protections in the legal process against arbitrary governmental action.
V. Application of the Just Compensation Clause to Economic
Sanctions Programs
A more sophisticated understanding of the Just Compensation Clause
should lead the judiciary to create different standards for awarding com-
pensation in the foreign affairs context from those that it applies in do-
mestic "takings" cases. The application of these different standards
should emphasize two goals: protecting private property interests and
holding the Executive accountable for infringing upon those interests.
A. Physical Invasion
Deprivations of real property fall most clearly within the purview of
the Just Compensation Clause because they usually involve the tell-tale
marks of a "taking"-physical trespass or transfer of title. Such depriva-
tions are no less injurious when the property taken is located outside the
United States. The case law clearly states that, where just compensation
claims for the taking of property located abroad come before a U.S.
court, the location of the property should not be a factor in the court's
analysis. 81 For example, the Claims Court, in Seery v. United States,
found that a "taking" occurred when the government seized a claimant's
house in Austria for use as an officer's club. 82
creditor. He suggests instead that the bankruptcy power is limited by its own context, and not
by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1031.
The very nature of the bankruptcy power serves to disrupt even the most settled expecta-
tions of secured and unsecured creditors. When a creditor is unable to foreclose on a piece of
land during bankruptcy proceedings and suffers a loss, there is no compensation. Whatever
the merits of the result, the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution has been read to allow the
"taking" of property when such action is necessary to give the debtor a "fresh start." See
generally Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1985).
80. See, e.g., I1 U.S.C. §§ 361-63 (1982) (discussing "adequate protection" for the
creditor).
81. See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (allowing adjudica-
tion of takings claim where property was located in El Salvador); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745
F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that takings claim could be adjudicated where property
was located in Honduras),judgment vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Porter v.
United States, 496 F.2d 583, 591 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (adjudicating plaintiffs' takings claim regarding
property located in United States Pacific Trust Territories), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975);
Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (allowing adjudication of takings claim
where property located in Austria).
82. Seery v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 601 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
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The outcome in Seery is consistent with the dramatic loosening of ter-
ritorial constraints on U.S. prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction dur-
ing the last forty years.83 The protection afforded by the Bill of Rights
does not end at the water's edge, but extends to any U.S. government act
affecting U.S. citizens anywhere in the world.8 4 Property located abroad
may be subject to the risks of foreign legal process, but it should not also
be subject to the unjustified abstention of U.S. courts. Where the U.S.
government and not a foreign state injures American property interests,
the doctrine of territoriality, based on notions of comity and the desire to
avoid jurisdictional conflicts with other states, does not apply. Under
these circumstances, U.S. courts should not be constrained by territorial-
ity from protecting American property interests. Interestingly, the
United States vehemently advocates "prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation" 85 for foreign government expropriations of American
property. There is no reason why compensation should not also be
prompt, adequate, and effective when the United States takes the prop-
erty of its own citizens as a result of its foreign policy decisions.
The analysis above tracks the case law in an attempt to prove that
territoriality should not be an issue in just compensation suits. To the
extent, however, that prior decisions diverge from this conclusion, we
urge that they be rejected and that the principle of just compensation for
takings abroad be adopted. For example, some courts have denied
claims for takings abroad when the United States is not.a direct benefici-
ary of such takings. Thus, the taking of an American ship by the post-
World War II government of Japan-a government that had been func-
tioning under the de facto control of the American military-was held
not to be compensable because the United States allegedly did not benefit
from the Japanese government's use of the ship.86 Contrary to the
court's decision, however, where the United States has either signed a
treaty that "takes" title or allows a foreign state to assume title as part of
the agreement, or has itself acquired use of the contested property, it
should be held liable in the Claims Court for its actions.87 Even though
83. The United States has, for example, been aggressive in breaking down the territorial
constraints on the application of U.S. law. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). As one scholar put it, "[i]n the past twenty-five years
the United States has had three major exports: rock music, blue jeans, and United States law."
Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law, 14
INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980).
84. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957).
85. See 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'I. L. 1226 (1980).
86. Anglo Chinese Shipping Co. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 553, 557 (Ct. Cl. 1955),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955).
87. We note that, despite the foreign affairs context of the taking, the "treaty exception,"
28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982), to the Claims Court's jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982),
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there may be no "direct" benefit, the U.S. government should bear the
costs of actions taken to further its foreign policy goals.
At the same time, the above analysis may not require compensation
when the U.S. government takes physical possession of property interests
of foreign states. One common exercise of the foreign affairs power is the
freezing of assets in which foreign states have an interest.88 Courts have
denied takings claims for frozen assets, 89 treating the temporary depriva-
tion of the use of property during an assets freeze as a form of regulation.
should not apply. 28 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) states that "the United States Claims Court shall
not have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent upon
any treaty entered into with foreign nations." The leading Supreme Court case to interpret the
treaty exception, United States v. Weld, 127 U.S. 51 (1888), declared that the predecessor of 28
U.S.C. § 1502 contemplated a "direct and proximate connection between the treaty and the
claim, in order to bring such claim within the class excluded from" jurisdiction. Id. at 57
(emphasis in original); cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981) (claim for just
compensation arising out of nullification and transfer of judicial attachments, pursuant to Ex-
ecutive Agreement, would not be barred from Claims Court by "treaty exception."). But see
Trimble, Foreign Policy Frustrated-Dames & Moore, Claims Court Jurisdiction and a New
Raid on the Treasury, 84 COL. L. Rv. 317 (1984) (arguing vigorously, and at length, that
Supreme Court erred in Dames & Moore when it stated that treaty exception did not bar
claims for compensation arising out of the nullification and transfer of the Iranian attach-
ments). Lower courts have followed the analysis in Weld when construing 28 U.S.C. § 1502.
See, eg., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 889, 905 (Ct. Cl. 1976) ("As in
Societe Anonyme, the instant case, too 'would never have arisen were it not for the existence
of' [the treaty] ... "(quoting Societe Anonyme des Ateliers Brillie Freres v. United States, 160
Ct. Cl. 192, 197-98 (1963))); S.N.T. Fratelli Gondrand v. United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 473, 478
(1964) (treaty exception does not bar claim where the claim "is founded, rather, on the Consti-
tution" and not on the treaty in question).
88. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,170, supra note 4 (freezing Iranian assets); 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.201 (freezing Cuban assets). Of course, assets freezes raise a host of policy problems,
even if such freezes do not rise to the level of constitutional takings. Any seizure of foreign-
owned property invites reciprocal action on the part of the target state, and puts comparable
American property at risk around the globe. If U.S. foreign policy is predicated on norms of
free trade and the protection of international economic interests from national control, the
Executive will always be cautious about freezing property in which a foreign state has an
interest. The self-enforcement of this norm might better serve to protect American property
interests from a freeze than would the imposition of an ex post compensation requirement by
the courts.
Assets freezes also raise problems when the government attempts to extend them extraterri-
torially, as in recent actions against the foreign-held assets of Iran. The executive order freez-
ing Iranian assets extended to "all property . . . of the Government of Iran, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities.., which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States or which are in or come within the possession or control of persons subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States." Exec. Order No. 12,170, supra note 4. By its terms, the
executive order thus applied to such assets as dollar-denominated Iranian deposits in the for-
eign branches of U.S. banks. While such freezes may be possible, they often generate jurisdic-
tional conflicts between the United States and the country where the assets are located. Cf
DeSouza, The Soviet Gas Pipeline Incident: Extension of Collective Security Responsibilities to
Peacetime Commercial Trade, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 92 (1984) (discussing the reaction of U.S.
allies in Western Europe to the extraterritorial reach of the Soviet gas pipeline sanctions).
89. See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966) (freezing assets is
not a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966);
Tole S.A. v. Miller, 530 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same).
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This result may be thrown into doubt by a new development in just com-
pensation law in which the Supreme Court held that temporary takings
may be compensable.90 Despite that ruling, courts should continue to
deny compensation for frozen assets where a foreign state seeks to invoke
the Fifth Amendment. The very purpose of an assets freeze would be
undermined by a judicial grant of compensation, which would render an
important economic weapon useless.
B. Taking of Expectations
U.S. courts should also take a more active role in protecting invest-
ment-backed expectations in foreign affairs. Such expectations are other-
wise left completely vulnerable to the discretion of the Executive Branch.
Investment interests of U.S. citizens in foreign countries enjoy few pro-
tections other than the Just Compensation Clause, and thus a more leni-
ent standard of compensable expectations should be applied in the
foreign affairs context.
Of course, one could argue that there are no legitimate expectations
protected by the Just Compensation Clause since individual interests
abroad or those connected to foreign states or nationals exist only
through the sufferance of the U.S. government. 91 Such an argument,
however, fails to recognize that in the foreign affairs context there are
fewer alternative protections from arbitrary government takings than in
the domestic context.
A better analysis of takings claims would accord more, not less, pro-
tection to property expectations in the foreign affairs context, where few
procedural constraints limit the government's discretion. 92 While a suc-
cessful foreign policy is important, the need to allow the President to act
in ways that harm domestic parties should not leave those parties with-
out any constitutional redress.
1. New Property
In recent decades there has been a profusion of government-created
property interests. In 1964, Charles A. Reich declared that among "the
most important developments in the United States during the past
90. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987) (Fifth Amendment may require compensation for temporary takings due to regulation).
91. See, e.g., Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 245 (1983) ("The rights
of nationals trading or traveling abroad are bound up in another, perhaps more fundamental,
aspect of a nation's foreign relations. It is the existence of cordial relations between nations
that makes trade possible."), aff'd, 765 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909
(1985).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
Vol. 13:146, 1988
Economic Sanctions
decade has been the emergence of the government as a major source of
wealth. Government is a gigantic siphon. It draws in revenue and power,
and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises,
and licenses."'93 Reich labelled this government-created wealth "the New
Property." Broadly defined, the New Property consists of "government
largess-allocated by government on its own terms, and held by recipi-
ents subject to conditions which express 'the public interest.' -94
Since foreign commerce is so heavily regulated by the federal govern-
ment, its existence often depends wholly or partially upon a web of
licenses, permits, and rights. Many of the interests that a government
takes when it cuts off commerce with a target state fit squarely within
Reich's conception of New Property. For example, licenses are com-
monly required to export goods from the United States. 95 As Reich ob-
served in the context of occupational licenses, "such licenses, which are
dispensed by government, make it possible for their holders to receive
what is ordinarily their chief source of income."' 96 When the government
bans all exports to a particular country, it simply revokes all the relevant
export licenses. The government thus deliberately destroys the property
expectations created by the issuance of those licenses.
Courts have generally denied Fifth Amendment protection to New
Property in the international context. Thus, the government was not
held liable when it denied port rights97 or placed restrictions on a preex-
isting fishing permit.98 The theory behind these decisions seems to be
that, where the government creates wealth, it retains the right to take
such wealth away as it sees fit. Government takings of New Property,
however, often devastate businesses and bankrupt private parties who de-
pend upon particular licenses for their livelihood. As noted earlier, lack
of Fifth Amendment protection for such takings in the domestic context
is often balanced by other protections. 99 A claimant with international
interests, however, is not so fortunate. Under current case law, a claim-
ant must not only bear the heavy burden of proving that her expectations
are legitimate, but also realize that no federal court would attempt to
enjoin the conduct of foreign policy in order to protect her business deal.
93. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
94. Id.
95. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (1982) (discussing the
types of licenses needed to export from the United States).
96. Reich, supra note 93, at 734.
97. Canadian Transp. Co. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1168 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd in part,'
rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
98. Organized Fishermen of Florida v. Watt, 590 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.Fla. 1984), aff'd sub
noma. Organized Fisherman of Florida v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 2890 (1986).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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An example of New Property that should be compensable is export
licenses.100 Export licenses are routinely taken when the President bans
all exports to a target state. Such a ban can inflict a variety of injuries on
exporters. When an exporter has a contract to ship goods to the target
state, he suffers the loss of current and future business. The inability to
trade also deprives him of his previously held market share.
Where licenses are taken for foreign policy reasons, exporters should
be able to recover the value of contracts that are in the process of being
performed at the time the export licenses are revoked, i.e., the value of
the unpaid or unperformed balance. Failure to protect at least this inter-
est could create major disincentives to the signing of trade contracts.
Further, the argument for compensating outstanding balances is sup-
ported by the reliance theory of economic harm. When the government
creates wealth by licensing the use of public resources, 0 1 it encourages
U.S. manufacturers and shippers to invest and contract in reliance upon
those allocated rights. The government should not subsequently be al-
lowed to revoke such rights without paying just compensation.
In contrast, the loss of potential profit or maximal value is generally
not compensable under the Fifth Amendment, no matter how certain an
individual may be that her lease would have been renewed or her con-
tract signed.102 While the long-term economic effect on license holders
may be enormous, the Just Compensation Clause cannot provide relief to
potential property interests not yet established.
Licenses that allow for pre-judgement attachment against a foreign
state also merit compensation. Dames & Moore10 3 involved such
licenses. In that case, the Treasury Department issued revocable licenses
to individual claimants, encouraging them to pursue attachments in
100. See Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403 (1982).
101. See Reich, supra note 93, at 736 (arguing that "[u]se of public resources," including
"routes of travel and commerce such as the airways," are a form of New Property).
102. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 482
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., White and Blackmun, J.J.) ("The
holding in Petty was consistent with a long line of cases to the effect that the Fifth Amendment
does not require, on a taking of a property interest, compensation for mere expectancies of
profit."); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (tenant whose lease contained
"termination on condemnation" clause had no right to compensation in a condemnation pro-
ceeding); United States ex rel TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281-82 (1943) ("In absence of a
statutory mandate.., the sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not for opportunities
which the owner may lose."); cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 239 (1942) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("For we are not dealing here with physical property-whether chattels or
realty. We are dealing with intangible rights, with choses in action. The fact that the claims
were reduced to money does not change the character of the claims, and certainly is too tenu-
ous a thread on which to determine issues affecting the relation between nations."). One
should note, however, that the majority opinion in Almota allowed a recovery based on the
expectation that the plaintiff's lease would be renewed. 409 U.S. at 478.
103. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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court against Iranian property. 1' 4 The intent behind these licenses was
to give the United States another "bargaining chip" in negotiations with
Iran.105 The Treasury's bargaining chip, however, also created a recog-
nized property interest which the Algiers Accords subsequently extin-
guished. When claimants with licenses sued for an injunction against the
enforcement of the Algiers Accords, they also asked for just compensa-
tion for their lost attachments. 106 The Supreme Court, predictably, re-
fused to enjoin the enforcement of the Algiers Accord. It further held
that the nullification of the attachments was not a "taking."10 7 In our
view, the Court was mistaken: such a nullification should be compensa-
ble as a taking. 0 8
2. Judicial Property
Substantial property expectations can also be created by the judicial
process. Judicial property includes both claims filed but not yet adjudi-
cated and final awards. The right of U.S. citizens to go to court and have
their claims adjudicated can rarely be destroyed within the domestic con-
text, because the President has extremely limited power to interfere with
the judicial process.' 0 9 However, a common feature of foreign affairs ac-
104. 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1980); see also 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980) (licenses granted
could be "amended, modified, or revoked at any time.").
105. See Brief for Federal Respondents at 28, Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (No. 80-2078)
("In the present case, the initial blocking of the Iranian assets after the hostages had been
seized... served both as an official response to that hostile action and as a form of economic
pressure upon Iran to release the hostages and to resolve the resultant crisis."); cf id. at 29
(freezing orders also designed to "provide[ ] for the settlement of claims of the United States
nationals against the country whose assets were frozen.").
106. See, eg., Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines, 518 F. Supp. 69, 92-94 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), rev'd, 657 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1981).
107. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 n.6; see also id. at 690 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
108. Cf id. at 690 n.1 ("Even though the Executive Orders purported to make attach-
ments conditional, there is a substantial question whether the Orders themselves may have
effected a taking by making conditional the attachments that claimants against Iran otherwise
could have obtained without condition.") (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
109. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) ("[I]f the
President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it would be only because it is
one the courts were not authorized to render. Judgments within the powers vested in courts by
the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused
faith and credit by another Department of Government."); see also White v. Mechanic Securi-
ties Corp., 269 U.S. 283, 301 (1925) (President may interfere with domestic litigation in U.S.
courts only with express consent of Congress); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.)
641, 648 (1875) ("[lIt is clear that when such a claim as that preferred by the claimants in the
original petition passes into judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction it ceases to be open,
under any existing act of Congress, to revision by any one of the executive departments or of
all such departments combined."); cf. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898)
(state legislature could not withdraw authorization for a suit after a lower court had rendered
judgment, but before state supreme court had acted on appeal); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809) ("If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the
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tions is that claims against foreign states or foreign nationals are settled
outside of the domestic judicial context. This process usually nullifies
individual claims in return for either a lump-sum settlement, the transfer
of claims to an alternative tribunal, or merely an intangible diplomatic
benefit.110 By preventing claims from being brought in the U.S. federal
courts under these circumstances, the President is taking whatever prop-
erty interests inhere in the right to bring such actions.11
Nevertheless, courts have gone to striking lengths to deny just com-
pensation to private claimants who have been ill-served by settlements,1 12
and have consistently denied compensation for claims settled by the Ex-
ecutive. 113 Past practice does not mean, however, that "takings" result-
ing from executive settlements will not be recognized in the future.
Dames & Moore explicitly holds that "the question whether the suspen-
sion of claims constitutes a taking" is one which may be adjudicated in
the Court of Claims.114
To resolve the question of whether the suspension of claims results in a
taking, we suggest that the Court of Claims and appellate courts apply
the analysis developed above. Our reasoning rests on the argument that
just compensation is required most where no other protection exists and
the property expectations are not unduly attenuated. Claimants against
foreign states do receive minimal protection in other fora, and these pro-
tections are usually commensurate with the degree to which their claims
are legitimate property interests. These claims may also receive some
protection during negotiation of settlements in cases where private claim-
ants exert pressure upon the Executive to achieve maximum value for the
surrender of their claims. In addition, Congress has the power to reject
claims settlements whenever it judges such settlements not to be benefi-
cial to private claimants. Thus, when the President sought in 1973 to
settle over $105 million in claims against Czechoslovakia for only $20.5
million, Congress quickly enacted legislation that required the renegoti-
judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under these
judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery .... ").
110. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679 ("[IThe United States has repeatedly exer-
cised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries."); id.
at 680 n.9 (citing ten claims settlements by the United States since 1952).
111. Settlements seldom cover the actual losses to the injured parties. For a listing of
various claims settlements and amounts received by the claimants, see Brief for Intervenor
Bank Markazi Iran at app. 1, Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654.
112. See, eg., Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983) (action brought
against President's unilateral settlement of claim does not constitute a valid takings claim
when based on grounds that the settlement did not reflect the full monetary value of the
claim).
113. See, e.g., id. at 245-46; Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. CI.
1970).




ation of the agreement. 115 Finally, the Internal Revenue Code provides
relief for injured claimants by allowing a deduction for property expro-
priated by a foreign state.116
Courts hearing just compensation suits should consider the effective-
ness of these alternative protections on a case-by-case basis. If the expec-
tations of the claimants are remote, as in a tort claim against a hostile
foreign state, 117 then the protections offered by the courts should be
weighed against the political process protections afforded the claim-
ants." 8 In these situations, courts must recognize that compensation for
lost claims is available through other parts of the legal process which
might be more suitable than judicial hearing.
The unique nature of the foreign affairs power presents many other
potential ways to affect property interests. It is impossible to draw abso-
lute theoretical lines around the types of action that demand compensa-
tion. This analysis merely suggests that when the claim is not remote
and other protections are not available, the courts should be more willing
to apply just compensation principles to protect private property
interests.
Conclusion
The broad economic sanctions power of the Executive should be bal-
anced by a recognition of the economic costs that sanctions can impose
within the United States. If courts recognize their ability to impose con-
stitutional constraints on executive action without jeopardizing the mak-
ing of foreign policy, sanctions planners will be forced to take all relevant
costs into account. This prescription does not try to shift the decision-
making authority in foreign affairs away from the President. Rather, it
offers protection to private interests and promotes the spreading of losses.
In doing so, it encourages a rational cost/benefit analysis by the Execu-
115. Lillich, The Gavel Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974, 69 AM. J. INT'L L.
837, 839-41 (1975).
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 172 (b)(D) (1986) (allowing taxpayer to take net operating loss car-
ryforward for foreign expropriation losses); id. § 172(h) (defining foreign expropriation losses).
117. This is the nature of the claims of the former U.S. hostages in Iran, who assert that, in
extinguishing their tort claims against Iran through the signing of the Algiers Accords, the
President violated the takings clause. See, e.g., Cooke v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 695 (1983)
(denying class certification to former hostages and their families); Belk v. United States, 12 Cl.
Ct. 732 (1987) (holding that extinguishing former hostages' causes of action against Iran, by
signing Algiers Accords, did not constitute a taking).
118. The political process appears to have protected the interests of the Iranian hostages
rather well. First, negotiation by the executive branch secured their release, and "this... was
a very valuable benefit for the compromise of their claim." Belk, 12 Cl. Ct. at 734. Second,
Congress passed legislation authorizing special pay, educational, medical, and income tax ex-
emption benefits for the hostages and their families. Hostage Relief Act of 1980, P.L. 96-449,
94 Stat. 1967 (Oct. 14, 1980).
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tive in the pursuit of its foreign policy, and hopes to ensure that executive
decisions will serve both the domestic and the international interests of
the United States.
